Military (also) Needs Logistical Innovations

Opinion

Indonesia’s recent defense guidelines have comprehensively outlined the government’s military modernization programs. Although those documents have specified a broad range of arms acquisition plans up to 2024, they still lack a clear vision on the development of a robust logistics support system and capabilities.

Logistics is the “life blood” of military affairs. It covers issues related to the supply, movement and maintenance of the armed forces.

In general practice, distribution of logistical resources involves “wholesale” and “retail” operations. They respectively refer to the delivery or stockpile of huge amounts of war materials to forward logistics bases, and the distribution of specific supplies to tactical units that need them.

Logistical supplies are critical for the operational readiness and sustainability of weapon systems on the battlefield. Without ammunition, fuel and spare parts, the battle tanks, artillery pieces, fighter aircraft and warships are just “paper tigers”.

Prominent military thinkers throughout history, including Jomini and Mahan have noted a close relationship between combat elements and logistical support. Hence, they underlined the gravity of interior “lines of operation” or “lines of communication”, which help to shape the course and outcome of warfare.

Logistical means available serve to connect numerous operational factors, including technology, the type of forces involved, weather and the geographical landscape. Their effective combination makes a range of military maneuvers possible, thereby allowing the commanders to exploit them to win a war or battle.

In that sense, the process of arms modernization should go hand in hand with innovations in military logistical affairs. As military planners seek to develop new war-fighting concepts with newly procured weapons, they ultimately have to upgrade the capabilities and proficiency of combat support units to deliver logistical supplies.

There are five key issues which military planners must take notice of to develop the Indonesian Military’s (TNI) logistics support system and capabilities.

First, logistics need to derive from war-fighting concepts. Different styles of warfare entail different logistical arrangement and capabilities.

For decades, the TNI’s leadership has established a logistical network to anticipate protracted guerilla warfare against a superior enemy. This network rests on overt and covert institutions to maintain political conformity and mobilize resources in wartime.

Nowadays, a highly dynamic threat environment has placed new demands for rapid force deployment to key flash points. Meanwhile, the vast maritime domain and diverse landscape of the Indonesian archipelago make such military maneuvers difficult. These operational requirements are logistical in nature. Hence, the TNI leadership should gradually transform its current logistics establishment, with its emphasis on strategic and tactical mobility, to allow force projection throughout the archipelago.

Second, the solution to logistical problems lies in developing a flexibility to deploy combat elements and supplies in an effective manner. Given the operational challenges of future military maneuvers, military logisticians must optimize the technological developments of transportation a means in terms of speed, distance and tonnage.

Typical barriers to sea lift are undeveloped seaports and natural obstacles, such as soft sandy beaches, marshes, swampland and loose surfaces. Modern amphibious vessels, including air cushioned and roll-on/roll-off catamaran landing crafts offer greater speed, payload and accessibility to most of Indonesia’s coastlines and ports. The acquisition of these technologies would enhance the TNI’s amphibious assault capabilities and inter-island mobility to transfer troops, heavy armor and supplies.

An increased demand for rapid force deployment means the growing role of airlift capabilities. Recent aviation advances have increased the cargo capacity, operational range and versatility of aerial transportation to support airborne operations. Under specific terrain, weather and threat conditions, the potential distance and payload requirements suggest that short take-off and landing aircraft appear more appropriate to resupply ground forces than rotary-wing and tilt-rotor aircraft.

Third, diversifying supply networks is a crucial measure to avoid major logistic breakdowns. Multiple accesses to logistical resources would minimize the chances of the enemy completely disrupting material supplies to friendly forces.

Airbases and naval bases are among the critical logistic assets to sustain military forces in a theater of war. While devoting some defensive measures to protect these assets from enemy raids, TNI’s logisticians must prepare complimentary means or alternative facilities to maintain the healthy flow of supplies to fighting units. These include the development of mobile offshore base and dual-function national infrastructures, such as commercial freighters, railways and highways.

Fourth, the actual logistics requirements of military operations are likely to exceed peacetime planning and estimates, not less. Given the sustainability of their unit is at stake, field commanders have every reason to be wary of having logistics shortfalls in wartime.

Indonesia’s “minimum essential force” (MEF) is still an under-developed concept for military logistics planning. Amid the absence of actual military threats and financial constraints, the developers of “tables of organization and equipment” may unwittingly overlook some critical aspects of logistics that appear only in real-time operation. Hence, the biggest challenge for military logisticians is to delve deep into the logistical details of the MEF capabilities based on future war-fighting concepts.

Fifth, logistics success is a matter of preparation and training. Because the substitutes nothing real knowledge of combat situations, military logisticians must rehearse their detailed logistics plans under realistic conditions. Proper exercise would minimize poor logistics performance that ultimately causes the armed forces to run unacceptable risks in wartime.

Looking at its routine exercises, the TNI tends to involve only battalion-size units, or occasionally brigades, to maneuver at one time. Such exercise suffers some logistical drawbacks. While ammunition and fuel are used on a lesser scale, the units involved are only required to evacuate minor casualties and repair a small number of wrecked armored fighting vehicles. This means not only are retail supply operations are severely tested, but also the proficiency of combat service support is poorly measured.

Moreover, the nature of Indonesian archipelago demands a joint operation among the armed services. As each military branch and units raises different problems and offers various opportunities, the effectiveness of logistical supports becomes critical to execute and sustain such operation. To understand the implications of their respective advantages or disadvantages, military logisticians must closely examine the way that they work together under specific operational conditions.

Having said all that, for the armed forces to gain a full advantage of war-fighting capabilities, they must invent innovative ways to wed their logistical assets with the operational requirements of their military strategy and order of battle.

Iis Gindarsah,
The writer is a researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta.

● The Jakarta Post