The unusual naval exercise late last week is considered to have been a deliberate and provocative move by the Chinese that will send a clear message to the region.
For the first time, the Chinese navy sent warships sailing through the Sunda Strait between the Indonesian islands of Java and Sumatra.
The ships travelled along the southern edge of Java, close to Christmas Island, and then through the Lombok Strait between Lombok and Bali.
The move is considered to be an unprecedented show of military might by the Chinese, and will have a significant impact on security and strategic policy settings for Australia and our regional neighbours, particularly Indonesia and India.
Analysts believe that by sending ships through the region in such a fashion, Beijing is making it clear that it now considers the Indian Ocean a strategic priority.
They believe it signals that China will deploy its military to protect its interests in the region if needed.
RAAF scrambles plane to observe Chinese naval exercise
Australia scrambled an air force surveillance plane earlier this month to monitor an unannounced Chinese military exercise that took the emerging superpower's ships closer to Australian territory than ever before.
In what observers say is a significant strategic development, China carried out combat simulations at the beginning of the month between Christmas Island and Indonesia in an apparent flexing of its growing naval muscle.
China had not announced the exercise. When Australia became aware that the three Chinese vessels were sailing across the waters to the north, the Royal Australian Air Force sent an AP-3C Orion maritime surveillance plane from RAAF Base Edinburgh, near Adelaide, to observe.
The Chinese flotilla - two destroyers and a landing ship able to carry hundreds of marines - came closer than the People's Liberation Army Navy ships had ever come while carrying out such an exercise. It was the first time China had carried out a military simulation in Australia's maritime approaches.
The three warships came through the Sunda Strait between Java and Sumatra, skirted along the southern side of Java - taking them close to Christmas Island - before turning north through the Lombok Strait next to Bali.
Analysts stressed China's move was legal - taking place in international waters - and not inherently hostile. But it did constitute a signal by Beijing that it meant to become a truly global naval power, which fundamentally changed Australia's strategic position. Rory Medcalf, director of the Lowy Institute's international security program, said China was sending a message it considered the Indian Ocean part of its maritime domain as well as the Pacific.
''It should focus Australian minds because for decades Australian defence policy has been based on the view that Indonesia is between us and the great powers of East Asia. That's no longer quite the case,'' he said.
The signal was directed not at Australia but to the Asia-Pacific region more broadly - including a message to the United States and India that they could not blockade the vital sea lanes through the Strait of Malacca in the event of a crisis of conflict with China.
Hugh White, professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University, said the exercise was ''a very vivid demonstration of how far and fast those changes are happening''.
''It doesn't mean that this exercise is threatening to Australia but it does show how much the region is changing and how dangerous it is to assume - as successive Australian governments have done - that China can rise economically … without it making a fundamental strategic difference to the region.''
A spokesman for Defence Minister David Johnston said Australia had not been informed in advance but there had been no obligation for China to do so.
China makes statement as it sends naval ships off Australia's maritime approaches
Australia's strategic environment changed a week ago, even if much of our media did not notice. Last weekend, a Chinese taskforce of three warships steamed south through the Sunda Strait to conduct combat simulations and other exercises in the Indian Ocean, somewhere between Indonesia and Christmas Island.
The vessels, two destroyers and an advanced 20,000-ton amphibious ship capable of carrying some hundreds of marines (pictured), then skirted the southern edge of Java before heading north through the Lombok and Makassar Straits and into the Pacific.
This is the first substantial Chinese military exercise in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean and in Australia's maritime approaches. It seems also to be the first time a Chinese taskforce has transited the Sunda and Lombok straits as alternatives to the Malacca Strait.
With this decidedly Indo-Pacific foray, China is sending many signals, deliberately or not. One is about its ability and ambition to project force through and beyond the South China Sea. Another is its wish to be seen to be interested in protecting its commercial sea lanes into the Indian Ocean. A third is that the People's Liberation Army-Navy will go where it wants when it wants, without necessarily consulting or forewarning local powers.
A fourth is that the islands of East Asia are not a meaningful 'chain' to constrain China's military reach. In that sense, this exercise should be seen alongside a larger activity in the western Pacific last October.
To be clear, there was nothing illegal or fundamentally hostile about what the Chinese navy has just demonstrated. A greater Chinese security role in the Indian Ocean is inevitable and at one level a corollary of China's economic interests.
Even so, this recent episode is bound to raise questions in national security establishments across the region, including in India and Indonesia as well as in Australia. I will have more to say about that next week in a joint opinion article with prominent Indian strategist Raja Mohan (a Lowy Institute nonresident fellow and incidentally my co-chair in a major Australia-India dialogue that kept us busy this week).
Although the Chinese navy may have surprised us all with the precise timing and nature of its Indo-Pacific venture, nobody can accuse Beijing of a lack of transparency in its public reporting during the event.
Indeed, the coverage of the exercise in the Chinese media and on social media is a textbook case for intelligence analysts and policymakers in how so-called 'open sources' can provide early warning of change in the strategic environment – earlier, I suspect, than much of the secret stuff.
I first learned of the exercise six days ago, with help from a friend who makes a habit of monitoring Chinese-language press, the magic of Google translate, as well as a tweet from American China expert Taylor Fravel. Within another day or two, Chinese state television was proudly reporting, in English and in some technical detail, about the Indian Ocean drill. These and other Chinese reports were more than enough to piece together a clear sense of the route and activities of the three ships, as well as the historic nature of their voyage.
Yet days passed before much of this made it into the international English-language media, and I am yet to see serious news coverage in Australia (the Hindu's excellent China correspondent was a little quicker off the mark).
The precise strategic implications of the Chinese navy's newly-demonstrated ability to operate in Australia's northern approaches are open to debate. Neither China nor Australia wants a confrontational relationship. The idea that China might pose a direct military threat to Australia remains far from mainstream in our strategic debate. Australia has rightly sought to engage China as a security partner in recent years, for instance in disaster-relief exercises.
Even so, it is a safe bet that the voyage of the three Chinese warships Changbaishan, Wuhan and Haikou will prove far more consequential to Australia's strategic future than any number of those certain other vessels in the waters off Indonesia that have so dominated our media and political attention of late.
RAAF keeps tabs on Chinese
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| Scrambled: An RAAF P-3 Orion. Picture: Defence |
The West Australian _understands the Defence Department ordered a RAAF P-3 Orion plane to monitor the vessels as they carried out a series of anti-piracy and search and rescue drills.
Chinese media reported this month that a three-ship navy squadron sailed into waters between Australia and Java on January 29 to carry out an exercise.
It is believed to have been be the first time the Chinese navy has come so far south to conduct a drill of this kind.
The episode comes amid growing tensions over China's territorial claims and after warnings from Beijing that Australia should stay out of a dispute between China and Japan.
It is believed Australia was tipped off to the presence of the Chinese vessels by US officials, who had been monitoring their journey south.
The P-3 maritime surveillance aircraft was then scrambled to trail and watch the vessels.
Chinese State media revealed on February 4 the country’s largest amphibious landing ship, the Changbaishan, had travelled to the Indian Ocean, along with two destroyers.
Chinese reports said the squadron passed through the Lombok Strait near Bali before heading north again towards the Philippines.
The Changbaishan is one of China’s most modern warships and is capable of carrying helicopters, more than a thousand troops and amphibious landing craft.
The Defence Department said it was aware of the presence of the Chinese vessels but would not comment on suggestions it had sent an aircraft to keep watch on them.
“(The Chinese vessels’) movement was consistent with international law governing the exercise by military forces of freedom of navigation in international waters,” a Department spokeswoman said.
“Australian naval vessels also exercise the same freedoms.”
Japan, the Philippines and Malaysia have all expressed alarm in recent months at Beijing’s increasingly muscular approach to territorial disputes in the region.
Late last year Beijing took the unusual step of lodging an official protest with Foreign Minister Julie Bishop after Australia objected to China’s establishment of an "air defence zone" in disputed waters off Japan.
The Chinese embassy in Canberra complained of Ms Bishop’s "erroneous remarks" on the issue and appeared to hint free trade talks between Australia and China could be damaged if Australia continued to side with Japan and the US in the dispute.
Chinese Naval Exercise In Eastern Indian Ocean Sends Mixed Signals
Earlier this week, China held a three-ship naval exercise in the Indian Ocean, conducting a series of exercises including combat simulations. According to the Associated Press, the task force then sailed through to the western Pacific by way of the Lombok Strait near Indonesia’s Bali island, approaching the Philippines. Before conducting a five-day exercise in the Indian Ocean, the ships had additionally patrolled the James Shoal, which is currently disputed between China and Malaysia (although Malaysia military officials are reportedly disputing the idea that China patrolled the area in late January).
The task force consisted of the Changbaishan–China’s largest amphibious landing ship–and two destroyers–the Wuhan and Haikou. According to Chinese state broadcaster CCTV, the ships carried out counter-piracy, search and rescue, and damage control drills. The ships eventually left the Indian Ocean to continue their drills in the Western Pacific Ocean. The Changbaishan is one of the more advanced ships in the PLAN’s fleet and is capable of launching helicopters and amphibious landing craft.
China has conducted naval drills in the Indian Ocean in the past but has generally focused on restricting these to its western waters, by the Gulf of Aden. For example, an exercise in August 2013 saw the U.S. and Chinese navies jointly practice counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden which is generally a hot region for pirates based off the Horn of Africa.
These exercises by contrast are potentially far more provocative for India, Australia, and ASEAN states (even though Southeast Asia isn’t bereft of pirates by any means). For India, a Chinese approach in the eastern Indian Ocean raises anxieties about the reach of China’s navy. India regards the eastern Indian Ocean–the space between the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Sumatra–as its domain. Any Chinese exercises in this area, particularly combat simulations, will not be taken lightly by New Delhi.
Australia is generally content to accept the Indonesian archipelago as a comfortable buffer zone from the busy sea lanes of the South China Sea. By way of this exercise, China demonstrates an operational ability in Australia’s northern waters which could have implications for Australia in the future. Rory Medcalf of the Lowy Institute, an Australian think-tank, notes that “the precise strategic implications of the Chinese navy’s newly-demonstrated ability to operate in Australia’s northern approaches are open to debate.”
For China, the exercises make perfect sense in its bid to field a blue-water navy capable of operating outside China’s proximate waters. Medcalf notes that while these exercises will surely spook some observers in the region, there is “nothing illegal or fundamentally hostile about what the Chinese navy has just demonstrated.”
Indian observers appear to be more concerned by the exercise. One Indian commentator, Srikanth Kondapalli, notes that the exercise sends a signal to India that China “can come closer to the Andaman & Nicobar joint command through Lombok, and not just through Malacca.” He additionally notes that China could be testing the waters in the eastern Indian Ocean, including its ability to operate some distance away from its bases in the region.
The Hindu’s Ananth Krishnan notes that the exercises could also reflect China’s desire to hedge its reliance on the Strait of Malacca–a major waterway for Middle Eastern oil and other imports. 80 percent of China’s fossil fuel imports travel via the strait. Beijing has already invested heavily in Pakistan, Myanmar, and Bangladesh to better connect itself with the Indian Ocean. Generally speaking, China hasn’t seen the less-trafficked straits of Lombok, Sunda, and Makassar to the south as vital to its so-called “Malacca dilemma,” but this could be changing.
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