Indonesia’s arm candy: Quantity vs capability dilemma

Arm candy is commonly termed as a person that someone takes to public outings not to enjoy their company but simply to appear important, wealthy or worthy of attention. What is Indonesia’s arm candy? Replace “a person” with “arms” and “someone” with “Indonesia”, and you get this sentence: Arms that Indonesia takes to public outings not to enjoy their company but simply to appear important, wealthy or worthy of attention.

Sounds harsh? It is. And sadly, it is the ugly truth of what has been going on with Indonesia’s arms procurement.

In February, the Indonesian government signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on defense cooperation with the Netherlands. The MoU includes production of war equipment (arms procurement) between the two countries.

Arms procurement, undeniably, is crucial for Indonesia, not only because of the country’s arms modernization agenda but also on account of the country’s bid to achieve its Minimum Essential Force (MEF) framework designed to increase its military capability.

Nonetheless, we have to keep in mind that arms procurement is a matter of national security. With national security at stake, procurement has to be carefully and properly executed in accordance with the policy, strategy, doctrine of defense, budget support and the state’s territorial geography.

Besides, arms procurement is extremely expensive. A tiny mistake could inflict huge nominal loss on the state.

However, if we look at past arms procurement, it seems like the Indonesian government has repeatedly executed them in a mischievous manner.

The procurement of F-16 fighter jets through a grant is just an example. The government’s decision to receive 24 secondhand F-16 fighter jets from the United States was strongly criticized by House of Representatives Commission I overseeing defense, which argued that the jet fighters were sitting neglected in the Arizona desert and Indonesia had to pay more than US$ 700 million to repair and bring them here.

The procurement was also not in line with the strategic plan (renstra) approved by the commission, which earlier approved six new F-16 Block 52’s for $ 600 million. However, for some unclear reason, the government changed its mind and purchased the used, discarded jet fighters instead.

The likely result of this F-16 procurement is that the number of aircraft Indonesia owns will increase but not its air defense capability.

The procurement of Leopard tanks has a similar story. It triggered a polemic as the tanks do not suit Indonesia’s territorial geography.

Al Araf, program director of military watchdog Imparsial, said the purchase “is not on the arms procurement list in Indonesia’s defense posture development policy paper until year 2029”.

Former president BJ Habibie, who is a domestic strategic industry pioneer, was also furious about the Leopard tank procurement. He said, “People who buy Leopard tanks are stupid and profit-seeking fools.” He encouraged the cancellation of the procurement.

Yet, despite all the criticism, the government went ahead with its plan. The public has not forgotten the alleged markup in the purchase of Russian-made Sukhoi jet fighters.

The most unfortunate procurement of course was the Indonesia-South Korea’s joint production of KFX jet fighters, which was terminated unilaterally by the East Asian country. This cancellation cost Indonesia around Rp 1.6 trillion ($140 million). South Korea has reportedly decided to resume the project, but the damage has been done.

Thus far, most of Indonesia’s arms procurement, either in the form of a grant, purchase, or joint production, has not been well executed. It would be best for the Indonesian government to take lessons from its past experiences so that it can make wiser deals with the Netherlands.

What underlines the controversy surrounding arms procurement is the government’s option for arms quantity over capability. In fact, given the extent of Indonesia’s territory and its defense budget, which is amounts to less than 10 percent of the state budget, it is impossible for Indonesia to procure highly capable military defense arms in large quantity (Indonesia’s defense budget and state territory ratio lags behind Singapore’s 24.4 percent defense budget).

The current defense budget and territorial extent has left Indonesia with two rational procurement choices: Procuring large quantities of military arms with decent defense capability or procuring high capability military arms in small quantities.

In the meantime, based on its needs to achieve its arms modernization agenda and to reach its MEF plan, the Indonesian government can precede with the quantity-based strategy, which would see Indonesia initially procure a large sum of arms with decent capability. This strategy, of course, has to be applied with transparency and accountability, and has to set specific targets as well as a timeline.

After its arms modernization agenda and MEF are achieved, the government can move onto a capability-based arms procurement strategy.

If we could choose, undoubtedly, we certainly would like to procure military arms with super capability in large quantities. However, we must be realistic. If our defense budget cannot meet such procurement, we can always find alternative solutions. The strategy above could be one of many, perhaps.

Regardless of the strategy Indonesia employs in its next arms procurement, there is one thing that needs to be underlined: Military arms procurement is a national security matter. Hence, arms cannot be procured in the same manner as a person procures his or her arm candy.

The writer is a researcher at the Institute for Defense Security and Peace Studies and a contributor at the Marthinus Academy, Jakarta.

The Jakarta Post