Casualties suffered by the combatants involved in the Afghan and Iraqi theatres have focused the attention of vehicle designers on the provision of protection to a wide range of tactical vehicles. It appears that this is a trend they are approaching in very different ways.
by Stephen W. Miller
In the past when discussing military vehicles one spoke of “tactical vehicles” and “armoured vehicles”. “Tactical” vehicles were for support. These included light vehicles for utility, liaison and miscellaneous duties; medium-weight trucks for transport, maintenance plus artillery prime movers and heavy trucks. “Armoured” vehicles required protection for their combat roles or their proximity to the “front”. However, recently this distinction has changed. In many armies major efforts and money are being spent on providing significant levels of protection to tactical trucks. It is also a driving requirement in new procurements like the United States’ Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).
What is behind this new emphasis on protection? What are the ramifications for vehicle design, capabilities and cost? What operational aspects remain to be understood? All these questions are worthy of further examination.
History
In the past when discussing military vehicles one spoke of “tactical vehicles” and “armoured vehicles”. “Tactical” vehicles were for support. These included light vehicles for utility, liaison and miscellaneous duties; medium-weight trucks for transport, maintenance plus artillery prime movers and heavy trucks. “Armoured” vehicles required protection for their combat roles or their proximity to the “front”. However, recently this distinction has changed. In many armies major efforts and money are being spent on providing significant levels of protection to tactical trucks. It is also a driving requirement in new procurements like the United States’ Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).
What is behind this new emphasis on protection? What are the ramifications for vehicle design, capabilities and cost? What operational aspects remain to be understood? All these questions are worthy of further examination.

Adding protection to tactical trucks as needed based on local threats has often been done by military units in the field. The armoured “gun trucks” fabricated by US Army and Marine units and used during the Vietnam War for convoy duty are an instructive example. These were limited efforts and not adopted across fleets. Overall, though, even in other counter-insurgency operations which occurred in Algeria and South Africa during the years of the Cold War the distinction between tactical trucks and purpose-built armoured vehicles, like the French Panhard AML (Auto Mitrailleuse Légère/Light Gun Amoured Car) wheeled light armoured reconnaissance vehicle and the South African BAE Systems Casspir remained clear.
Several development programmes during the 1980s saw attention being given to including protection from the outset in the design of some tactical wheeled vehicles. Initially this was restricted to moderate ballistic and fragment protection on specific mission vehicles. The US M1114 Armoured High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) from AM General, better known as the ‘Humvee’, introduced in 1985 had integrated ballistic protection in its reconnaissance and security configurations while retaining the basic vehicle configuration. Still, the majority of the HMMWV fleet remained unarmoured. The French Panhard VBL (Véhicule Blindé Léger/Light Armoured Vehicle) went a step further by utilising a welded steel armour crew unit placed on to its automotive chassis. The VBL was small, mobile and designed specifically for combat missions. Thus it was optimised for its primary role and not envisioned for general or utility use.
The Japanese Self Defense Forces took a similar view. Komatsu Defence developed its KU50W LAV (Light Armoured Vehicle) which was fielded from 2002. It is similar to the VBL but with four side doors as opposed to two on the VBL. Its compact size and tight turning circle are ideal for narrow roads and urban areas. It can perform internal response, base security and defence roles and has provided protected transportation for Japanese Ground Self Defence Force contingents in humanitarian operations. Nevertheless, without integral blast protection its future suitability for operations outside Japan is open to question.New Threats

Responding to the threat the US military developed and rapidly-fielded Armour Survivability Kits (ASKs). Though effective against projectiles they were less effective at defeating bombs. A larger problem, especially regarding the HMMWV, was their increased 350-1,000kg (770-2,200lb) weight. This reduced the vehicle’s payload and overloaded their engines and suspension while reducing reliability. Only introduction of the purpose-built Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles in 2007 in the Iraqi theatre effectively countered the threat, reduced casualties and allowed freedom of operation to be regained.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) involvement in Afghanistan and the subsequent 2006 ramp up of operations against the Taliban saw the large number of countries present in the Alliance-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) threatened by insurgent bombs. By now the lessons of Iraq (see above) and the implication for military forces engaged in peacekeeping, stabilisation and other combat and potential combat operations was being appreciated worldwide. Sensitivity toward casualties and the impact on public support within several ISAF members was also recognized as a growing concern. This was especially true for militaries in Europe, Japan, the United States and South America.
Undoubtedly the greatest challenge was addressing the roadside bomb and mine, particularly in lighter vehicles. The MRAP had done so but were heavy at 13,000-18,000kg (28,600-39,600lb) in terms of combat weight. This was far beyond the eight or nine tonne all-up weight sought in light vehicles. With its history of dealing with mines resulting from its experience in the southern African ‘Bush Wars’ of the 1970s and 1980s, it is not surprising that South Africa was one of the first countries to introduce a fully-protected light tactical vehicle. The OMC Land Systems South Africa RG32M and its sister the RG32M LTV (Light Tactical Vehicle) were derived from the earlier unarmoured Scout light tactical vehicle. The RG32Ms have an armoured “crew citadel” coupled with a shallow V-shaped hull allowing it to survive a six-kilogram (13lb) blast under its hull or wheel despite its low 9.5 tonne combat weight which includes a payload of up to 2,200kg (4,400lb). The design effectiveness is illustrated by an incident in Afghanistan where a Swedish RG32M hit a large mine with an explosive power in excess of the design and was flipped over, yet the crew walked away without major injury. The RG32M was adopted in 2005 by Sweden and subsequently fielded by five other countries. Johan Steyn, managing director of OMC Land Systems South Africa, stated that today “over 480 RG32M vehicles are in service with several armed forces”.
IVECO Defence of Italy developed its Light Multirole Vehicle (LMV) with the concept of a baseline vehicle inherently adaptable to meet user protection demands. The goal was to offer a vehicle weighing under eight tonnes that could be armoured to the customer’s requirement. The LMV accomplishes this also with a “citadel’ structure much like the RG32M discussed above. Around the LMV’s citadel frame armour modules are installed at the factory level to achieve mine and some levels of ballistic protection. The LMV offers up to NATO Standardisation Agreement 4569 Level 3 ballistic protection against 7.62mm armour-piercing ammunition at a range of 30m (98ft) and Level 2A mine and grenade protection safeguarding against a six-kilogram explosion under any wheel. Other LMV design features include automotive commonality allowing the interchange of service and spares across the LMV product line. The vehicle can also carry a 2,600kg (5,732lb) payload in its unarmoured configuration and up to 1,500kg (3,306lb) payload with a protected crew cab. The LMV’s adaptability is demonstrated by the many variants available from IVECO Defence including a new extended-length cab version with a 3.5m (eleven feet) wheel base (compared to 3.2m/ten ten feet) in the standard LMV). It is perhaps not surprising that LMV has been selected by ten countries with over 4,000 vehicles fielded to date.
The United States has pursued a competition for a small and light mine-protected vehicle suitable for conditions in Afghanistan. Oshkosh Truck of Wisconsin, United States won the sole award in June 2009 and subsequently began delivery of its MRAP-All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV). Its 14,700kg (32,340lb) gross weight includes a 1,800kg (3,967lb) payload. The M-ATV’s mobility has proved attractive for forces wishing to use the vehicle in the patrol role. Nevertheless the M-ATV’s tight interior and limited stowage space are issues as regards its employment as a general utility vehicle. Over 9,500 MATVs were delivered to the US Army and ordered by the United Arab Emirates. General Dynamics European Land Systems (GDELS), meanwhile, offers what might be called a dual-design approach in the form of its Duro which is a purpose-built armoured logistic and support vehicle with a configuration optimised for these roles. It also offers the Eagle light tactical vehicle configured for protected patrol. They appear completely different but are designed to share automotive components to reduce the logistics burden of each vehicle. Future directions

Recently Kevin Fahey, head of the US Army Programme Executive Office for Combat Support and Combat Service Support, stated that “our problems have had nothing to do with the programme, and everything to do with the budget”. AM General, Lockheed-Martin and Oshkosh Defence all have candidates in testing to fulfil the JLTV requirement. A production award is expected in late 2015 for the construction of 50,000 JLTVs for the Army and 5,500 for the Marine Corps with the first units equipped by 2018. However, the Marines have price and weight concerns with a spokesperson for the Corps saying that “(t)he focus right now is on what is good enough… and on how that’s going to impact across ground combat tactical vehicle strategy.” Australia



Which approach is better is hard to assess. Vehicle developers must strike a balance in often contradictory operational and performance desires. Greater transportability, particularly by helicopter, limits weight yet higher protection increases weight. Logistics vehicles need payload volume for more cargo. Patrol and reconnaissance troops prefer vehicles to be discrete. Opposing demands can sometimes be rationalised by new materials but often at increased cost. Without hard decisions on what capabilities are absolutely essential, the greater the number of “mandatory” requirements will be, thus the more expensive the vehicle becomes. In addition, it is critical that the military user has a sound concept of employment for their vehicle as without this balance a platform can result that is neither mission capable nor affordable.
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