Latgab 2013 : Marinir Menusuk Pantai, Kostrad Terjun Dari Langit

Panglima TNI Laksamana TNI Agus Suhartono meninjau Operasi Amfibi pada Latihan Gabungan (Latgab) TNI Tingkat Divisi tahun 2013, di pantai Sekerat, Sangatta, Kalimantan Timur. Inilah salah satu latihan terbesar yang digelar TNI.

Dari bibir pantai Sekerat, pendaratan Amfibi dilakukan oleh prajurit-prajurit Korps Marinir TNI Angkatan Laut. Sementara itu jajaran Yonif Linud 501/Brajayudha melaksanakan Lintas Udara (Linud).

Sebelum Operasi Amfibi yang dilaksanakan pada hari H jam J yang ditandai dengan gelombang pertama mendarat dengan menembur pantai, terlebih dahulu dilaksanakan proses Bantuan Tembakan Kapal (BTK) untuk menghancurkan kedudukan musuh di pantai pendaratan yang dapat menggagalkan pelaksanaan Operasi Amfibi.

Sementara itu, 6 buah pesawat tempur TNI AU yang tergabung dalam Komando Tugas Gabungan Udara (Kogasgabud) melancarkan serangan udara yang kerap diberi nama Operasi Lawan Udara Ofensif (OLUO) di wilayah udara Kalimantan. Serangan udara tersebut dilakukan dengan composite strike, antara lain oleh 2 buah pesawat tempur F-16 dan Sukhoi.

Gelombang-gelombang pendaratan mulai diluncurkan dari KRI-KRI pengangkut pasukan pendarat Amfibi. Dimulai dengan mendaratkan satu Kompi Tank Amfibi selanjutnya bergerak taktis menggempur kekuatan musuh di pantai. Gelombang 2 terdiri dari Kompi Kendaraan Pendarat Amfibi (Ranratfib) mengangkut pasukan untuk menyerang maju bersama Kompi Tank dengan Kerja Sama Infanteri Tank (KSIT) untuk menduduki sasaran-sasaran yang telah direncanakan sebelumnya.

Gelombang 3 dari unsur Ranratfib mendarat untuk membantu pasukan yang lebih dulu mendarat dan menghancurkan kedudukan musuh yang masih berada di sekitar pantai.

Sementara itu di tempat terpisah, dari udara melintas sebanyak 6 pesawat Hercules yang mengangkut ratusan personil dari Yonif Linud 501/Brajayudha untuk melaksanakan Operasi Linud dibawah Satgas Linud Brigif l-17/Kujang 1 Divif 1 Kostrad.

Operasi Linud ini merupakan bentuk operasi gabungan antara TNI-AD dan TNI AU yang dilaksanakan dengan cara diterjunkan atau didaratkan ke daerah sasaran dalam rangka merebut dan menghancurkan sasaran yang bersifat taktis dan strategis.

Selanjutnya 3 unit Helikopter pengangkut prajurit-prajurit melaksanakan lintas Heli ke sasaran yang bertujuan untuk merebut dan menduduki sasaran yang dapat mempengaruhi dan menentukan dalam pelaksanaan perebutan tumpuan pantai pada operasi amfibi.

Latgab TNI besar-besaran ini berlangsung mulai tanggal 15 April sampai dengan 24 Mei 2013. 16.745 Prajurit TNI mengikuti latihan ini.(mdk/ian)

  ● Merdeka  

★ ITS dan PT Solusi-247 Kembangkan Radar Maritim

CONTOH: Integrated Maritime Surveillance System (IMSS), sistem radar maritim bernilai Rp 543,9 miliar ini merupakan bantuan AS kepada Indonesia. Secara konkret, IMSS terdiri atas 18 stasiun pengawas pantai (CSS), 11 radar berbasis kapal, dua pusat komando regional, dan dua pusat komando armada di Jakarta dan Surabaya. PROKIMAL ONLINE Kotabumi Lampung Utara | Radar Maritim IMSS TNI-AL Efektifkan Pengamanan Laut Di Selat Malaka. (Ist)

Surabaya • Institut Teknologi Sepuluh Nopember (ITS) Surabaya dan perusahaan penyedia layanan teknologi komunikasi PT Solusi-247 menjalin kerja sama untuk mengembangkan "marine radar" (radar maritim).

Kerja sama itu ditandatangani oleh Direktur Utama PT Solusi-247, Beno Pradekso, bersama Pembantu Rektor IV ITS Prof Dr Darminto di Gedung Rektorat ITS Surabaya, Rabu.

Beno Pradekso mengatakan pihaknya kini sedang gencar melakukan riset untuk pengembangan produk perusahaannya, karena itu pihaknya menjalin kerja sama dengan beberapa perguruan tinggi, seperti ITS.

"Beberapa bidang riset yang akan kami lakukan dengan ITS antara lain Marine Radar, Electric Support Measure (ESM), Radio Direction Finding (RDF) Receiver , Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS), dan Integrated Surveillance framework," katanya.

Menurut dia, perusahaannya telah melakukan riset ESM hampir 90 persen dan telah diuji di Pelabuhan Tanjung Priok.

"Pengawasan laut yang belum optimal, karena keterbatasan fasilitas menjadi dasar bagi Solusi 247 untuk mendalami aplikasi teknologi produk itu di bidang maritim," katanya.

Hingga saat ini, persoalan mengenai kecelakaan kapal, "illegal traffic", pencurian ikan, hingga pembajakan kapal nelayan menjadi masalah tak terpecahkan karena lemahnya aktivitas monitoring.

"Oleh karena itu, kami mengajak ITS, kami memiliki pengetahuan tentang sensor dan radarnya, sedangkan ITS punya pengetahuan di bidang maritim dan perkapalannya," katanya.

Beno mengatakan ITS adalah mitra yang sangat sesuai untuk melaksanakan kerja sama ini, karena ITS unggul di bidang maritim, lalu keberadaan sentra nelayan, pelabuhan internasional, dan armada pertahanan laut di Surabaya juga menjadi nilai tambah tersendiri.

Senada dengan itu, Prof Dr Darminto mengatakan kerja sama itu bukan pertama kalinya ITS bekerja sama dengan pihak swasta.

"Kami berharap produk-produk yang dikembangkan nanti dapat benar-benar digunakan untuk kepentingan masyarakat," katanya.

Untuk tahap awal, kerja sama akan dilangsungkan selama dua tahun. "Tidak perlu kita menggunakan produk asing untuk aplikasi ICT di Indonesia. Lebih baik kita buat sendiri dan kita kuasai teknologinya," katanya.(*/Ant)

  ● Formatnews  

Terungkapnya Jaringan Teror di Balik Aksi Perampokan

Polisi membongkar jaringan teroris Abu Rodan. 7 tewas, 13 ditangkap.

Lokasi penangkapan terduga teroris di Kampung Batu Rengat, Desa Cigondewah, Margaasih Kabupaten Bandung, Jawa Barat.

Polisi membongkar jaringan Abu Roban dan menangkap kelompok pelaku aksi terorisme itu. Jaringan itu terungkap dari hasil pengembangan penyelidikan dan penyidikan sejumlah kasus aksi teror oleh tim Detasemen Khusus 88 Anti Teror (Densus) 88.

Densus 88, kata juru bicara Mabes Polri Brigjen Pol Boy Rafli Amar dalam jumpa pers di Jakarta, Kamis 9 Mei 2013, mendapat temuan baru setelah menelisik jejaring teroris dari kelompok Toriq, Kelompok Abu Omar, dan Kelompok Kodrat.

Sejumlah petunjuk mengarah ke target baru, yaitu Kelompok Abu Roban. "Data-data yang terungkap dari hasil penyelidikan dan penyidikan telah menghasilkan target baru," ujar Boy.

Muhammad Toriq ditangkap polisi pada 2012 lalu lantaran diduga melakukan perakitan bom dan ditemukan sejumlah benda persis bahan peledak di kediamannya di Jalan Teratai 7, RT 02 RW 04, Tambora, Jakarta Barat.

Abu Omar adalah penyelundup senjata api kepada jaringan teror di Indonesia yang telah ditangkap pada 2010 lalu, dan kini sedang menjalani hukuman. Sedangkan Kelompok Kodrat adalah pelaku perampokan terkait aksi terorisme yang telah diringkus oleh Densus 88 pada Maret 2013 lalu.

Menurut Boy, dengan temuan baru itu, Densus 88 pun melakukan serangkaian penangkapan jaringan kelompok Abu Roban.

Pada Rabu kemarin, 8 Mei 2013, Densus 88 menyergap rumah kontrakan tempat persembunyian tiga orang terduga teroris di Kampung Batu Rengat, Desa Cigondewah, Kecamatan Margaasih, Kabupaten Bandung. Ketiganya berhasil dilumpuhkan sekitar pukul 18.30 WIB setelah dikepung sejak siang hari.

Drama pengepungan itu sempat tegang setelah ketiganya memberikan perlawanan dengan melemparkan bom pipa, dan sebelumnya melepaskan tembakan. Polisi sudah meminta ketiganya menyerah, tapi para teroris itu bertahan. Akhirnya polisi melakukan penyerangan dengan memberondong peluru dari berbagai penjuru ke rumah kontrakan itu. Ketiga terduga teroris itu pun tewas.

Sebelum penggerebekan itu, polisi menangkap sejumlah orang dari kelompok ini. Pada Selasa 7 Mei 2013, polisi membekuk William Maksum alias Dadan di Soreang, Bandung dan menyita pistol rakitan dan amunisinya serta senjata tajam. Dari penangkapan ini diperoleh informasi mengenai anggota kelompoknya yang berada di Jakarta dan Bandung.

"Dari situ kami melakukan upaya penangkapan atas Budi alias Angga di Kampung Batu Rengat, di rumah kontrakan yang bersangkutan," kata Boy.

Pada hari sama dengan penggerebekan itu, Boy menambahkan, polisi juga menangkap 5 anggota kelompok itu di sekitar Jakarta dan Tangerang, antara lain di Serpong, Pamulang, dan Meruya.

Pada Rabu 8 Mei 2012 itu juga, sekitar pukul 15.30, polisi menangkap Abu Roban di Kampung Limbung Batu, Kendal, Jawa Tengah. "Abu Roban ini pimpinan kelompok mereka," kata Boy. Dari penangkapan Abu Roban bersama dua rekannya pada Rabu itu, polisi menyita senjata api jenis FN, revolver, 9 peluru, dan perlengkapan lain.

Pengejaran kelompok ini ternyata tak hanya berhenti di Bandung. Penggerebekan atas jejaring teroris itu berlanjut dengan digerebeknya rumah kontrakan di Dusun Kembaran, Desa Ungaran, Kecamatan Kutowinangun, Kabupaten Kebumen, Jawa Tengah.

Menurut Boy, penyergapan di Kebumen ini berlangsung sejak pukul 8 malam Rabu 8 Mei 2013. Dan baru berakhir Kamis pagi, 9 Mei 2013, sekitar pukul 7.30 WIB. "Proses penangkapan memang agak alot," kata Boy. Sebab, petugas yang berusaha melumpuhkan mereka, ternyata mendapat balasan serangan senjata api dari empat orang di dalam rumah itu.

"Sempat terjadi kontak tembakan antara petugas kami dengan mereka yang ada di dalam," kata Boy. Namun akhirnya mereka juga berhasil dilumpuhkan oleh Densus 88, empat orang itu tewas. "Total yang kami tangkap adalah 20 orang, 13 diantaranya hidup, 7 meninggal," kata Boy.

Semua korban tewas dalam penggerebekan di Bandung maupun Kebumen itu dievakuasi ke RS Polri Kramat Jati untuk diidentifikasi lebih lanjut oleh tim DVI (Disaster Victim Investigation) Mabes Polri.

Boy menambahkan, kelompok Abu Roban ini terkait dengan buronan polisi lainnya bernama Santoso. Ia dianggap tokoh kunci, dan unsur gerakan aksi teror di Poso, Sulawesi Tengah.

Kepolisian terus berupaya mengungkap jaringan kejahatan ini dengan mengembangkan informasi seputar para figur dominan mereka. "Bukan tidak mungkin di kemudian hari akan didapat nama baru," kata Boy.

Para anggota teroris ini, Boy menambahkan, sudah sangat teroganisir dalam melakukan aksi. Dana mereka diperoleh dari hasil aksi perampokan. "Fai adalah upaya pengumpulan sejumlah uang dari setiap kejahatan yang dilakukan. Saat ini tercatat dalam data kami adalah perampokan," ujar Boy.

Beberapa perampokan yang tercatat, Boy melanjutkan, antara lain di BRI di Batang, Jawa Tengah, senilai Rp 790 juta, dan BRI Grobokan senilai Rp 630 juta, serta BRI Lampung senilai Rp 460 juta.

Bahkan dari hasil pemeriksaan para pelaku teroris sempat melakukan upaya pembakaran pasar Glodok. "Tetapi gagal, pada waktu itu berhasil digagalkan masyarakat sebelum api membesar," kata Boy.

Menurut Boy, penangkapan anggota kelompok di Kebumen pun sebenarnya bagian dari upaya menggagalkan rencana mereka melakukan perampokan. "Sebenarnya mereka ini juga sedang menargetkan aksi perampokan, atau fai untuk pengumpulan dana aksi teror. Mereka rencanakan di Kebumen, tapi berhasil digagalkan petugas kami," kata Boy.

Polisi mengimbau agar warga selalu mewaspadai gerakan kelompok aksi terorisme ini. Mereka senantiasa berupaya masuk ke tengah masyarakat, biasanya sebagai pendatang, dan melakukan perekrutan. "Waspada dengan upaya perekrutan sel-sel baru. Mereka cari uang dengan cara-cara kekerasan," kata Boy.

  ● Vivanews  

Medan Murders Most Foul, And With Relish (1)

By Benedict R Anderson

Domestic mass murder on a large scale is always the work of the state, at the hands of its own soldiery, police and gangsters, and/or ideological mobilization of allied civilian groups. The worst cases in the post-World War II era - Guatemala, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Sudan, Bosnia, Rwanda, Liberia, China, East Pakistan, East Timor, and Indonesia - show much the same bloody manipulations.

It is equally the case that the killer regimes do not announce publicly the huge numbers killed, and rarely boast about the massacres, let alone the tortures that usually accompany them. They like to create a set of public euphemisms endlessly circulated through state-controlled mass media.

In the age of the United Nations, to which almost all nation-states belong, in the time of Amnesty International and its uncountable NGO children and grandchildren, in the epoch of globalization and the Internet, there are naturally worries about "face", interventions, embargoes, ostracism, and UN-ish investigations. No less important are domestic considerations.

National militaries are supposed heroically to defend the nation against foreign enemies, not slaughter their fellow-citizens. Police are supposed to uphold the law. Above all, there is need for political "stability", one element of which is that killing should not get out of control, and that amateur civilian killers should be quietly assured that "it's over" and that no one will be punished.

But every norm has its exceptions. In the article that follows below, readers are invited to reflect on Joshua Oppenheimer's two recent sensational films about organized gangsters in and around the city of Medan (in northeastern Sumatra) who played a key, but only local, role in the vast anti-communist murders in Indonesia in the last months of 1965. [The two films are Jagal - its English title The Act of Killing - and Sungai Ular, or River of Snakes]

Almost 50 years later, they happily boast about their killings, with the grimmest details, and relish their complete immunity from any punishment. They are also happy to collaborate with Oppenheimer, contribute to his films, create bizarre reenactments of 1965, and do not hesitate to dress up their underlings to act as communists (male and female). The problem is to explain why Medan was the scene of the exception, within the larger framework of Indonesian politics from the late colonial period to the present.

The final irony is that Joshua's (and the gangster's) film is banned in Indonesia - that is to say, by Jakarta. [1]

It is worth mentioning that in the early years after Suharto's fall from power in 1998 (remembered as the time of Reform) censorship of publications almost disappeared. Long-forbidden works by dead communists - going back as far as the 1920s - were resurrected. Accounts by communist survivors of their suffering in Suharto's gulag circulated without being banned. A flood of conflicting analyses of "what really happened in 1965" sold well, especially if they claimed that the secret masterminds of the Gerakan 30 September were Suharto, the CIA, or MI-5.

It seems that the post-Suharto authorities assumed that the masses were not readers, and the distribution of the books by the market would depend on the character of regional readers (say, plenty in Java, very few in Medan). TV and the cinema were another story, since they appealed to large non-reading publics. Controversial films could arouse old and new hatreds and seriously threaten "stability".

Typically, the notorious Suharto-era film about Gerakan 30 September - or G30S - year after year forced on schoolchildren, was now silently taken out of circulation.

There is a jolting moment in Jean Rouch's famous "anthropological" film Moi, Un Noir, about a small, attractive group of young males from then French colonial Niger trying to find work in the more prosperous, but still French colonial, Cote d'Ivoire. We see them periodically at work, but most of the film shows them at leisure, drinking, joking, hooking up with women, so that the atmosphere is generally lively and cheerful.

But toward the end, we find the main character, who calls himself Edward G Robinson (parallel to a friend who names himself Lenny Caution), walking with a sidekick and an invisible Rouch along a riverside levee. Quite suddenly he starts to re-enact for the camera an ugly scene from his real or imagined past.

He was among the many francophone Africans who were sent as colonial cannon fodder to fight for France against the Ho Chi Minh-led Viet Minh - before the fall of Dien Bien Phu. He seems to enjoy replaying his bloody killing of captured Vietnamese. His sidekick pays no attention, making us realize that he has seen this shtick many times and knows it by heart. So the brief show is meant for Rouch and for us.

Once the scene is over, and the cheerful tone resumes, the viewer is immediately assaulted by the obvious doubts and questions. Why did Rouch include this short scene in an otherwise friendly film? Did Oumarou Ganda aka Edward G Robinson, who was Rouch's main collaborator, insist upon it? Why did the African perform this way, quite suddenly? Did he really do what he re-enacted?

Why the sudden turn from jokes to horror - and back? Did Rouch intend to situate the Niger boys of that generation in the large framework of the ferocious decline and fall of France's empire? Was Gonda releasing a kind of frustration about his life, and resentment of the French, perhaps even of his patron and friend, the famous Rouch?

When I watched the film, some years ago, it occurred to me that the crucial motif to think about was simply impunity. Like everyone else involved in France's huge, disastrous military endeavor to recover colonial Indochina between 1946 and 1954, the young African soldier could not be punished for "acts of war", no matter how sadistic and in contravention of the Geneva Convention. He would always be a hero of a very small sort thanks to this impunity.

At the same time, impunity is nothing without repetitive, boastful demonstration to different audiences. Drifting, poor, irregularly employed, Ganda takes on the menacing "Don"t mess with me, motherfucker!" persona of Edward G Robinson, the master actor of gangsters in the Hollywood of that era - who usually dies at the end of each film, but comes back as saturninely alive as ever in the next. But the film goes on to show the local hollowness of the impunity. In French Côte d"Ivoire, the colonial authorities put one of Ganda's comrades into jail, and clearly would not hesitate to nab the hero of Vietnam if he broke the local laws. At the end, he is beaten up by a large drunken Portuguese sailor in a quarrel over a prostitute.

Always somewhere in the back of my mind, this episode tentatively offers me a way to think about Rouch-fan Joshua Oppenheimer's extraordinary films about the massacres of communists in Indonesia in 1965-66, and their next-century reenactment before the camera. One of these films - Sungai Ular, or River of Snakes - shows (to me at least) a connection between the situations of Rouch and Joshua, as well as deep differences. The grisly re-enactment of the torture and murder of doomed communists on the bank of this river, half a century after they happened, is also about impunity and boastfulness.

The two starring elderly brutes take the young man from anti-communist USA as more or less on their side, just as Edward G Robinson took Rouch as a sympathetic anti-colonial Frenchman. But they also evince a kind of "Don"t mess with me, motherfucker!" attitude which they regularly practice for various other local audiences. They are not suspicious of Joshua's motives, and Joshua gets his own immunity from this guilelessness and also from inviting them and other killers to participate as they wish in the film-work, not merely as actors, but also as, up to a point, film-makers.

Another tie between the films is, as we shall see later on, the collaborators' fascination with Hollywood. This time not Edward G Robinson, outlaw, but Rambo and the Duke, patriots.

Yet Joshua's performing killers do not have their exact counterparts - so I think - in other parts of Indonesia; for example, East and Central Java, as well as Bali, provinces where the numbers of those barbarously tortured and murdered were far higher than in North Sumatra where the serpentine river flows. The question is why? In what immediately follows, I will try to offer a historical explanation that deals with the national-level and official version of 1965 and its commemorative aftermath, and at the same time contrast North Sumatra with East Java, which can be thought of as the most striking opposites.

Source: CIA

October l, 1965 - In the wee hours of that Jakarta morning, six important generals were murdered by soldiers and NCOs belonging to president Sukarno's elite guards, the Tjakrabirawa Regiment. At 7 a.m., a military group calling itself the September 30th Movement announced over the national radio that it had taken action to forestall a coup to overthrow Sukarno four days later, on Armed Forces Day. The deaths of the generals were not mentioned.

A few hours later, two key announcements followed. One declared that in place of the existing cabinet, a large Revolutionary Council would temporarily take power for protection of the president. Its membership was a weird mixture of left and rightwing civilians and military men, but also included the leadership of the September 30th Movement: one general, one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, and two or three lower down.

The second announcement was even stranger. The Movement said that lower military ranks were enraged by the corruption and sexual license within the military high command, which also neglected the poverty of the rank and file. Therefore, all ranks above that of lieutenant-colonel were abolished, while all supporters of the Movement would be promoted two ranks. A spectacular - and stupid - mutiny, in effect, creating a crisis of solidarity among clique-ridden generals and colonels.

The Movement did not last long. After 3 p.m. it went off the air, to be replaced at 7 p.m. by proclamations in the name of General Suharto, commander of the army's elite Strategic Forces, who, curiously enough, was not a target of the Movement. By midnight, the mutiny had been crushed, and its leaders scattered and on the hopeless run. The capital's newspapers, except those of the military, were closed down the next morning, and national TV, along with national radio, fell into Suharto's hands.

General Suharto front left, 1965. (New York Times)

The communists

The PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia - the Indonesian Communist Party, Asia's oldest) had made the fateful decision once Indonesian Independence had been recognized by the Dutch colonialists and the rest of the world (near the end of 1949) - to take the parliamentary road to power, shutting down a few small guerrilla bands left over from the revolution of 1945-49. In the first national elections (1955), it was already the fourth of the four huge parties that dominated parliament.

When provincial elections were held two years later in the densely populated and impoverished island of Java, it secured the largest number of voters, but still less than 25%. After that, elections were not held again. The primary reason for this was the government's decision in the spring of 1957 to declare nation-wide martial law in the face of warlordism, regional discontent, and rising, fanatical anti-communism in the so-called Outer Islands, most significantly in Sumatra and Sulawesi.

The situation deteriorated till the point that in February 1958 a civil war broke out between the now military-dominated government in Jakarta and its Sumatran competition, the PRRI, or Revolutionary Government of the Republic, led by a mixture of national-level "modernist" Muslim politicians, regional warlords, and many of the local inhabitants. A sister-rebellion in Sulawesi soon joined the Sumatrans. The rebellion, in spite of being heavily supported by the United States' Central Intelligence Agency, was rather quickly crushed by mostly Javanese troops loyal to the High Command, ironically with help from both the Pentagon and Moscow.

By the time president Sukarno repealed Martial Law in May 1963, the army had entrenched itself in national power and refused to tolerate any further nation-wide elections on grounds of "national security". But, protected by Sukarno, who used it to counterbalance the dangerous anti-communist army leadership, the PKI rapidly expanded its popular support by putting its energies into its mass organizations, rather than the parliamentary party. By early 1965, it was the largest communist party in the world outside the communist bloc, with over 3 million members, and perhaps 18 million followers in its mass organizations: for women, students, intellectuals, peasants, agricultural laborers, workers, fisherfolk, youths, artists and so on. (It was far better organized and disciplined than its political-party competitors).

The shift had momentous consequences. Electoral politics are punctuated in time from this election to the next; but mass organization politics are tensely ceaseless, day in day out, especially when no elections are foreseeable. In the early 1960s Indonesia became increasingly polarized between right and left.

A major factor was economic decline and an inflation that eventually became beyond control. People on fixed salaries and pensions, mostly civil servants, tried to maintain their standards of living by corruption, embezzlement, and investing in farm land. This last not only put pressure on land-hungry small farmers, tenants, and rural laborers, but clashed with the PKI's attempts to enforce a weak land reform law, fiercely resisted by landowners old and new.

Rural Medan today (Credit: Andre Vltchek)

Where such landowners were respected ulamas and rich hajis, resistance was often couched in terms of religion versus atheism. Many of them shrewdly donated surplus hectares to mosques as unalienable wakaf property, and sat on the boards administering these gifts. Now religious, no longer personal private properties, they were difficult for the PKI to attack, since even poor and land hungry Muslims would come militantly to their mosques' defense.

  ● Asia Times  

[Foto] Cantiknya CN-235 Pesanan TNI-AL

Jujur saja, ketika pertama kali redaksi ARC menerima foto CN-235 patroli maritim pesanan TNI-AL langsung dari PT.DI, hanya satu kata terlintas, cantik. Berbalur cat berwarna biru ke abu-abuan, pesawat ini tampak sudah siap mengudara mengamankan perairan nusantara. Informasi tambahan yang didapat ARC, pesawat pertama dari 3 pesanan TNI-AL ini akan diserahterimakan medio Juli-Agustus.

Namun demikian, informasi yang didapat juga menyebutkan CN-235 versi patroli ini belum berisikan mission suite untuk patroli. Peralatan yang terpasang masih sebatas Basic System Instalation. Semoga saja dalam waktu dekat segera dipasang peralatan deteksi mumpuni, agar CN-235 ini bisa maksimal menjalankan perannya di Nusantara. Sementara menunggu, mari kita nikmati saja foto-foto resolusi tinggi dari CN-235 yang cantik ini.

  ● ARC